# Token Exchange



Keycloak's Secret Weapon for Platforms KeyConf25

Amsterdam, 28.08.2025



### About me

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### Basic Platform Security Model



# Understanding Platform Planes

#### **Control Plane:**


Orchestrates the Data Plane; manages configs, deployments, and routing of service traffic.

#### **Management Plane:**

Provides administrative control over the entire platform; used by operators, SREs, and security teams.

#### **Data Plane:**

Handles user-facing traffic and business logic; executes requests but doesn't manage infrastructure.



## Examples of Platform Planes

			8 8 8 8
	Control	Management	Data
	Plane	Plane	Plane
Cloud Providers	IAM, Policy	API Gateway,	Compute &
	Enforcement	Service Mesh	Storage
Service Meshes	Istio Pilot, Consul Control Servers	Authentication & Service Discovery (Keycloak, SPIRE)	Sidecar Proxies, API Traffic (Envoy, Linkerd proxy)
Enterprise SaaS	Tenant	Identity	Tenant-Specific
	Management,	Federation, API	Applications &
	Admin APIs	Security Policies	Data Stores

# Security Through Plane Separation

- Isolated privileges
   Each plane gets only the access it needs.
- Reduced attack surface
   Compromising a Data Plane service won't give control over the platform.
- Clear trust boundaries
  - ✓ Management → Control
  - ✓ Control → Data
  - X Data → Management
  - X Data → Control
  - X Control → Management
  - ...
- Scoped tokens with Keycloak
   Use Token Exchange to grant
   least-privilege access per plane.



# The Challenge of Scalable Auth



User tokens leak too far

Tokens issued to frontends often reach backend services uncontrolled




Services lack identity isolation

No clear separation of scopes and audiences




Uncontrolled client access

Static credentials and hardcoded secrets increase exposure





Common Delegation Approaches



### Stitching together methods manually

This is cumbersome and error-prone, leading to security vulnerabilities and poor access control.

### **Using Client Credentials Grant (Service Account)**

This issues a token for the backend service but doesn't retain the user's identity or permissions.

## Forwarding the user's access token (Poor Man's Delegation)

This exposes scopes that backend services shouldn't have access to.

### Poor-Man's Delegation & Why It Fails

This breaks security principles like least privilege and separation of concerns.

```
"azp": "frontend",
"sub": "developer-123@apixion",
"aud": ["frontend", "backend"]
"realm access":{"roles":["user"]}
  "frontend":{"roles":["user"]},
  "backend": { "roles": [ "admin"] },
```

# Why is forwarding tokens a bad idea?



Over-privileged tokens

Token can be used across multiple backend services, even if they don't all need the same level of access.



No clear identity tracking

Difficult to distinguish by which service a request was made.



Security risks

If a single backend service is compromised, an attacker could use the forwarded token to access multiple other services.



Difficult auditing

Since the same token is passed around, logging mechanisms fail to capture true request origins.



### Token Exchange



# Introducing Token Exchange RFC8693



**/** 



User-to-Service Token Exchange

Securely exchange a user

token for a backend

service token.


Centralized API Token Management

Use a centrally managed API token to call external APIs.

Impersonation & Delegation

Act on behalf of another user or service, if permitted.


# Token Exchange – How It Works



Token Exchange in Keycloak




# Restricting Full Scope for Clients




# Configuring Token Exchange


Token Exchange Version	Configuration Requirements	Notes
Legacy Token Exchange (v1)	Must be enabled: - token-exchange - admin-fine-grained-authz (FGAP v1)	<ul> <li>Preview feature not enabled by default</li> <li>quite complex to configure</li> </ul>
Standard Token Exchange (v2)	Enabled by default since Keycloak 26.2; just enable the toggle in the client's settings	<ul> <li>Simplified configuration</li> <li>compliant with RFC 8693</li> <li>lacks support for external tokens</li> </ul>


# Assigning Permissions (V1)







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


# Assigning Permissions (V1)





## Enable Standard Token Exchange (v2)



# Performing a Token Exchange

```
POST /realms/apixion/protocol/openid-connect/token
HTTP/1.1
Host: keycloak.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic BASE64 (client id:client secret)
grant type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
&subject token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI...
&subject token type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access token
&requested token type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access token
&audience=some-backend-service
```

# Token Exchange Response and Token Validation

```
"iss": "https://.../realms/apixion",
"azp": "portal",
"sub": "developer-123@apixion",
"aud": ["some-backend-service"],
"realm access": { "roles": ["user"] },
"resource access": {
  "some-backend-service": { "roles": ["viewer"] },
```


# Token Exchange v1 vs v2

Capability	Token Exchange v1 (Preview, pre-26.2)	Standard Token Exchange v2 (Default, 26.2+)
Feature flag required	Must be enabled manually	X Enabled by default
Fine-grained permissions	Required for security	☑ Built-in per client
Audience switching	☑ Fully flexible (internal & external)	▲ Limited (only downscoping)
Internal ↔ Internal	✓ Fully supported	✓ Fully supported
Internal → External	✓ Supported	X Not supported
External → Internal	Supported	♠ Experimental, needs manual activation per feature flag
Complexity	<ul><li>High (AuthZ policies, mappings)</li></ul>	Simple (UI-based config)
Use cases	Advanced B2B, federation, SaaS	Microservices, platform-internal
Status	Deprecated	Recommended default

### Observability



# Audit Logs





# Monitoring – Logging

```
2025-02-28 23:10:15,414 WARN [org.keycloak.events] (executor-thread-3) type="TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ERROR", realmId="c6311f0b-e87a-423c-84e2-74f2a8618b40", realmName="apixion", clientId="frontend", userId="null", ipAddress="172.18.0.1", error="not_allowed", reason="client not allowed to exchange to audience", auth_method="token_exchange", audience="backend", grant_type="urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange", client_auth_method="client-secret"

2025-02-28 23:10:57,757 INFO [org.keycloak.events] (executor-thread-15) type="TOKEN_EXCHANGE" ...
```

#### Environment variables to visualize successful token exchanges:

```
KC_SPI_EVENTS_LISTENER_JBOSS_LOGGING_SUCCESS_LEVEL=info
KC_SPI_EVENTS_LISTENER_JBOSS_LOGGING_ERROR_LEVEL=warn
```

### Monitoring – Event Metrics

```
curl -s https://keycloak/metrics
 grep 'event="token exchange"'
keycloak user events total{
    client id="portal",
    error="",
    event="token exchange",
    idp="",
    realm="apixion"} 15422.0
keycloak user events total{
    client id="portal",
    error="not allowed",
    event="token exchange",
    idp="",
    realm="apixion"} 38.0
```



### Takeaways



### Best Practices on Platform-Level

### **Enforce Fine-Grained Permissions**

Always configure **strict Token Exchange policies**per client. Do not allow unrestricted token exchange.

### Disable Full Scope for Clients

Ensure clients/services only get the **minimal scopes** they need, preventing token misuse.

### Use Audience Restrictions

Tokens should always have specific target audiences to prevent cross-service misuse.

### **Establish Clear Trust Boundaries**

If your platform has **Planes**, define **explicit trust relationships** and enforce separation of concerns.

### Monitor and Audit Token Usage

Regularly inspect logs and metrics for unexpected token exchange requests to detect misconfigurations or security threats

#### Limit Token Exchange Availability

Not all clients should be able to exchange tokens—restrict it to approved services only via Keycloak permissions

# Final Thoughts



Why Token
Exchange is Key to
Secure Platforms



Token Exchange is critical for modern platforms



It prevents Poor-Man's Delegation



It enforces trust and separation in a platform



It strengthens microservices, API security, and external integrations

# Q&A – Let's Discuss









### Join Our Team

